Income Tax - Non-Business Bad Debt Deduction - Deduction for Partially Secured Bad Debt Deferable Until Liquidation of Collateral Regardless of Tax Avoidance Motive by Elliott, Robert H., Jr.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 4 
1957 
Income Tax - Non-Business Bad Debt Deduction - Deduction for 
Partially Secured Bad Debt Deferable Until Liquidation of 
Collateral Regardless of Tax Avoidance Motive 
Robert H. Elliott Jr. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert H. Elliott Jr., Income Tax - Non-Business Bad Debt Deduction - Deduction for Partially Secured Bad 
Debt Deferable Until Liquidation of Collateral Regardless of Tax Avoidance Motive, 55 MICH. L. REV. 599 
(1957). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/12 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1957] RECENT DECISIONS 599 
INCOME TAX-NON-BUSINESS BAD DEBT DEDUCTION-DEDUCTION FOR PAR-
TIALLY SECURED BAD DEBT DEFERABLE UNTIL LIQUIDATION OF COLLATERAL 
REGARDLESS OF TAX AVOIDANCE MOTIVE-In 1944 the taxpayer liquidated 
security held for a non-business debt and deducted the balance of the debt 
as worthless. The creditor had been insolvent for some time. The com-
missioner disallowed the deduction on the grounds that the taxpayer had 
held the security after the debt was worthless in order to obtain a larger 
tax benefit from the deduction. The district court upheld the Commission-
er. On appeal, held, reversed.1 A partially secured debt is not worthless as 
long as s~curity is available for its satisfaction. The taxpayer's intent is not 
a factor in determining worthlessness. Loewi v. Ryan, (2d Cir. 1956) 229 F. 
(2d) 627. 
Prior to 1942 bad debts were deductible in the year when ascertained to 
be worthless and charged off by the taxpayer.2 In 1942 an objective standard, 
"the fact of worthlessness," was substituted for the former subjective test.3 
In the same year the deduction for non-business bad debts was limited to 
those debts that were wholly worthless.4 A business debt may be deducted 
when partially worthless5 or it may be deferred until the debt is entirely 
worthless,6 so the rule laid down in the principal case is applicable to busi-
ness as well as non-business debts. The decision recognizes that a debt is not 
1 Majority opinion by Judge Hand, Judge Frank dissenting. 
2 Revenue Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 13, §23 (k) (1). Sabath v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 
1938) 100 F. (2d) 569; Reading Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 306. 
3 H. Rep. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 44 (1942); Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 
820, §124 (a). 
4 Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 821, §124 {a). 
Ii I.R.C., §166 (a). 
6 Ross v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 122; Allie M. Turbeville v. Com-
missioner, 31 B.T.A. 283 (1934). See also G.C.M. 18417, 1937-1 Cum. Bul. 142. 
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entirely worthless so long as property with some value7 is held as security.8 
The majority opinion specifically states that the court will not consider the 
intent underlying liquidation of the security in a particular year.0 Only 
if the debt had been originally incurred for the sole purpose of creating a 
bad debt deduction would the intent of the taxpayer serve to disallow a de-
duction.10 Congressional intent on this subject was indicated when Con-
·gress repealed the previous subjective test of worthlessness in 1942.11 This 
case carries to its logical conclusion the realization doctrine whereby a 
transaction has tax significance only when it is finally closed.12 The dissent-
ing opinion, arguing for the acceptance of the lower court's test of intent, 
states that Congress intended to allow this deduction on the basis of eco-
nomic fact rather than give the taxpayer an opportunity to take the deduc-
tion at will.13 It is true that the majority opinion, taken at face value, 
would lead to absurd results, e.g., a huge bad debt deduction could be post-
poned indefinitely by holding a small amount of collateral property. In a 
subsequent revision of this code section it would not seem necessary, how-
ever, for Congress to accept the view taken by either the majority or minority 
opinion. If the taxpayer continued to hold his security after it was clear 
that the debtor would be unable to satisfy the debt, the taxpayer would 
really be holding a capital asset in the hope of a gain and the tax significance 
of the debtor-creditor relationship would be factually at an end. Any 
further loss or gain would be attributable not to a bad debt but to the 
change in value of a capital asset. A code provision requiring the recogni-
tion of bad debt deductions in the year in which the debt becomes worth-
less, without regard to collateral, to the extent that the debt exceeds the fair 
market value of the collateral at that time would seem a desirable solution 
l_¥hich would raise no unique problems of proof. Fair market value would 
then be assigned as the basis of the security.14 Such treatment would avoid 
the problems of proof involved in the examination of the taxpayer's sub-
7 The taxpayer would have to prove that as of the first of the taxable year the security 
had some value and therefore the debt was not worthless. Judge Hand, in his opinion, 
speaks of what a "reasonable person in his place would have thought." (Principal case 
at 629.) Such a test would not seem defensible, however, in view of the objective statutory 
language. 
8 Old Colony Trust Associates v. Hassett, (1st Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 179; Industrial 
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 229; Kessler Oil and Gas Com-
pany v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 31 (1940). 
9 The court refused to follow a contrary decision of the Tax Court in In re Leopold 
Spingarn. P-H T.C. Mero. Dec. §48,129 (1948). 
10 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
11 Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 820, §l24(a). 
12 See 46 Mrca. L. REv. 854 (1948). 
13 See I.R.C., §461 (a). 
14 A "voluntary" conveyance of mortgaged property as final settlement of a debt. is 
treated in precisely this way under present law. I.T. 3548, 1942-1 Cum. Bul. 74. See 
Commissioner v. Spreckels, (9th Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 517. 
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jective intent in holding the security, and would deny to the taxpayer any 
opportunity to defer the recognition of bad debt deductions.15 
Robert H. Elliott, Jr. 
15 The suggested treatment would, however, require the proof not only of the 
creditor's inability to pay but of the fair market value of the security. 
